

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----042391 161543Z /50

O 161325Z APR 78 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PRETORIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LOGOS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTO 4074

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: RH, PDV, UK  
SUBJ: RHODESIA: ANGLO-AMERICAN/PF MEETING AFTERNOON APRIL 15

SUMMARY: THIRD MEETING OF FULL DELEGATION BEGAN LATE AFTERNOON  
OF APRIL 15TH AFTER DAY OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONGST PRINCIPALS,  
OBSERVERS AND PRESIDENT NYERERE (REPORTED SEPTELS). PF OUTLINED  
ITS CONCEPT FOR MANDATE OF UN FORCE WHICH ALLOCATED TO UN RESPONS-  
IBILITIES WHICH UNDER AAP ARE THE CONCERN OF RC, AND MADE ONLY  
PASSING REFERENCE TO SUPERVISION OF CEASE FIRE. ANGLO-AMERICAN SIDE  
OBJECTED TO PF'S UN FORCE IDEAS ALTHOUGH SECRETARY DID NOTE  
SOME AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE. PF PROPOSED THAT RC WOULD BE  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF WITH FULL EXECUTIVE POWERS IN DEFENSE AND  
LAW AND ORDER, TO BE EXERCISED IN CONSULTATION WITH RESPONSIBLE  
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MINISTERS. GOVERNING COUNCIL WOULD HAVE LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN  
ALL FIELDS AND ALL EXECUTIVE POWER EXCEPT IN AREAS RESERVED  
TO RC. PF SAID 8-3-1 RATIO PROPOSAL APRIL 14 FOR GOVERNING  
COUNCIL WAS NEGOTIABLE BUT THAT PF PREDOMINANCE ON THE GC  
WAS NOT. KNOMO AND MUGABE REACTED STRONGLY TO OWEN-VANCE  
ASSERTION THAT PF PROPOSAL TO CREAT GOVERNING COUNCIL WITH  
EXECUTIVE POWER, THUS LIMITING AUTHORITY OF RC, AS WELL

AS DEMAND THAT ONE GROUP HAVE DOMINANT POSITION IN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION ARE INCONSISTANT WITH BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AAP AND CONSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATIONS TO WHITE PAPER AND CAN NOT BE ACCEPTED. BOTH SIDES REPEATED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POSITIONS ON POLICE AS DELIVERED IN SESSIONS APRIL 14.

PF SAID THAT THEY DID NOT INSIST ON 2 TO 1 RATIO IN ITS FAVOR, BUT ARGUED THAT, AS IN MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, PF IS PREPARED TO INTEGRATE INTO ITS FORCES ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF RHODESIAN POLICE. CARVER REVIEWED PROPOSALS FOR CREATION OF ZNA. BOTH SIDES NOTED AGREEMENTS ON CEASE-FIRE AND ON FORMATION OF ZNA MUST BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE OF TRANSITION. RECURRING THEMES IN OWEN'S PRESENTATION APRIL 15 WERE A) BECAUSE OF CHANGING SITUATION, WE MAY NOW BE APPROACHING TIME IN WHICH PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REFLECT EXISTENCE OF TWO GROUPS (PF AND SALISBURY) RATHER THAN FIVE ENTITIES (GENEVA PARTICIPANTS); AND B) THOUGH PF PROPOSALS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH AAP, THEY ARE LEGITIMATE TOPICS FOR NEGOTIATION AMONG THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING AGENDA HAD BEEN AGREED TO BETWEEN PRINCIPALS PRIOR TO THE MEETING: UN FORCE; POWERS OF RESIDENT COMMISSIONER (RC); GOVERNING COUNCIL (CG); POLICE; ARMED FORCES; AND CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. ALL BUT THE LAST WERE DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETING.

2. UN FORCE: MUGABE RECAPPED PF'S POSITION ON UN FORCES AS STATED APRIL 14, I.E. PF WILL ACCEPT, IF UN FORCE MANDATE CLEARLY DEFINED CONFIDENTIAL

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AS ASSISTING PROGRESS OF DECOLONIZATION AND IF MANDATE TERMINATES AT INDEPENDENCE. HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS FOR THE FORCE:

- A. TO RESTRICT TO BARRACKS, DISARM AND DISMANTLE ALL UNITS OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE;
- B. TO UNDERTAKE ITS CONTROL AND TO STORE ALL AIR FORCE PLANES AND WEAPONRY;
- C. TO GUARD ALL RHODESIAN FORCES IN BARRACKS AND TO ENSURE THAT THEY REMAIN SO UNTIL INDEPENDENCE;
- D. TO MAINTAIN STATE SECURITY JOINTLY WITH THE PF FORCES (INCLUDING GUARDING OF THE BORDERS); AND
- E. IN EVENT OF A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATE TO CONSULT WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES IN ORDER TO GIVE MUTUALLY AGREED ADVICE TO THE RC. MUGABE ALSO SAID "THE COMPOSITION OF THE UN FORCE IN TERMS OF THE COUNTRIES SUPPLYING THE UNITS MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT." THE UN CIVIL POLICE FORCE WILL ACT IN AN OBSERVER CAPACITY IN RELATION TO THE NEW INTEGRATED POLICE FORCE.

3. SECRETARY VANCE ASKED WHETHER FUNCTION D -- MAINTENANCE OF STATE SECURITY JOINTLY WITH THE PF FORCES -- SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN

DEFENSE FORCE. MUGABE AGREED. THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT  
ADDING THE SAME PHRASE TO POINT E ELICITED A SIMILAR BUT LESS  
EXPLICIT ANSWER.

4. AFTER BRIEF INITIAL QUESTIONING BY CARVER, VANCE ASKED CHAND  
TO COMMENT. IN SUM, CHAND NOTED THAT ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS LISTED  
WERE IN SOME WAY RELEVANT TO UN MILITARY AND POLICE ROLES BUT  
NOT IN THE FORM SPELLED OUT. HE RELATED EACH OF THE FUNCTIONS TO  
TASKS OUTLINED IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CEASEFIRE/UN FORCE PROPOSALS,  
WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS SUCH. HE NOTED THAT ALL TAKS WOULD  
HAVE TO BE AND SAID ALL THESE THINGS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN  
COOPERATION WITH THE RC OR WITH THE MINISTERS OF SECURITY.  
IN RELATION TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES, CHAND NOTED THAT  
THE SECRETARY GENERAL NORMALLY CONSULTS WITH THE PARTIES  
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PRETORIA  
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INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE  
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EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

5. NKOMO OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO MOVE ON, NOTED THAT THE POINTS WERE NEGOTIABLE AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO DETAIL. SECRETARY VANCE MADE IT CLEAR THAT AS GENERAL CHAND HAD POINTED OUT THERE ARE SERIOUS QUESTIONS WHETHER THE FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED BY THE PF ARE PROPERLY THOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. LORD CARVER NOTED THAT THE BIGGEST OMISSION IN THE PF'S LIST OF FUNCTIONS WAS THAT OF SUPERVISION OF CEASEFIRE. MUGABE CONCEDED THAT THIS FUNCTION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE INCLUDED. CARVER ALSO NOTED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AAP AND PF PROPOSALS IS THAT UNDER AAP PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING SMOOTH AND PEACEFUL TRANSITION RESTS WITH THE RC ACTING THROUGH THE COMMANDERS OF THE RELEVANT FORCES. THE UN ROLE IS TO OBSERVE THAT IT IS DONE. SECRETARY VANCE REAFFIRMED CARVER'S POINT NOTING THAT THE PF IS ASKING THE UN

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TO DO MUCH THAT IS PROPERLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RC. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID THAT THE PF HAD SET OUT GUIDELINES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATED THE QUESTION OF THE MANDATE. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT THE PF WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY REWORKED TO REFLECT THE PROPER AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UN FORCES AS REFLECTED IN THE COMMENTS OF CARVER AND PREM CHARD.

6. POWERS OF RESIDENT COMMISSIONER, READING SLOWLY AND REPEATING HIMSELF FOR CLARITY, NKOMO OFFERED THE PF POSITION ON POWERS OF THE RC. HE SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE PROPOSALS ARE MADE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AGREEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED ON THE MILITARY AND POLICE PRESENCE OF THE PF. DESCRIBING THIS POSITION AS A MAJOR CONCESSION ON THE PF'S PART, HE STATED THE FOLLOWING: "THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER SHALL BE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE AND SHALL HAVE FULL EXECUTIVE POWERS IN DEFENSE AND LAW AND ORDER PROVIDED THAT SUCH POWER SHALL BE EXERCISED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE LEGISLATIVE POWER IN ALL FIELDS AND EXECUTIVE POWER IN ALL FIELDS EXCEPT LAW AND ORDER AND DEFENSE."

7. BRITISH LEGAL ADVISER STEELE ASKED WHETHER, IN PF'S FORMULATION, RC WOULD HAVE OVERRIDING EXECUTIVE POWER TO PUT ASIDE GC LEGISLATION IN RELATION TO DEFENSE AND LAW AND ORDER. ZANU LAWYER MBAKA NOTED THAT POWER LEGISLATION RESIDES IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND THAT THE RC WOULD NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT LEGISLATION IN THESE MATTERS. STEELE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE RC WOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE EXECUTIVE POWER IN OTHER FIELDS IF HE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO FULFILL HIS LAW AND ORDER AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, E.G. REQUISITIONING TRANSPORT.

MBAKA RESPONDED THAT THE PF PORPOSALS WHERE PRINCIPLES AND DETAILS  
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HAD NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. HOWEVER, IN A RATHER TNETATIVE FASHION  
HE SEEMED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RC WOULD BE ABLE TO  
OVERRIDE MINISTERS NOT ONLYIN DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY,  
BUT IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL IN COMPLETION OF HIS RESERVED  
EXECUTIVE POWERS. TO THIS, OWEN MURMURED "QUITE GOOD" AND  
MUGABE QUIPPED THAT "OWEN WAS OVERJOYED ABOUT OUR LOSS."

8. GOVERNING COUNCIL: NKOMO STATED THAT IT SI ESSENTIAL THAT  
PF KEEP DOMINANCE IN TERMS OF NUMBERS ON THE GC. HOWEVER,  
PF UNDERSTANDS THAT 8-3-1 RATIO MAY APPEAR TO BE TOO BIG AND  
IS PREPARED TO REDUCE THE NUMBERS IN NEGOTIATIONS. SECRETARY  
VANCE RESPONDED THAT GIVING GOMINANCE TO ANY ONE OF THE PARTIES  
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AAP. "IT IS SOMETHING I COULD NOT  
ACCEPT." MUGABE REACTED SHARPLY, " WOULD YOU LIKE US TO BE  
QUITE PROSTRATE AND LOSE EVERYTHING?" HE SAID IF PF IS TO BE  
INVOLVED IN THE CEASEFIRE ITS STATUS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN  
THE GOVERNING COUNCIL. OWEN NOTED THAT PF'S ARGUMENT THAT IT  
MUST HAVE PREDOMINANCE IN THE GC TO ENSURE THAT THE CEASE-  
FIRE AND THE TRANSITION NOT SEE AN EROSION OF ITS POWER COULD  
BE USED BY THE OTHER PARTIES AS WELL IN AN EFFORT TO CLAIM  
PREDOMINANCE. NKOMO RESPONDED THAT THE PF'S CLAIM, HOWEVER,  
WAS BASED UPON ITS VICTORY IN THE WAR: " WE HAVE WON--  
WE GOT SIMITH TO CHANGE AND WE BROUGHT HIM TO ACCEPT MAJORITY  
RULE."

9. OWEN THEN INTRODUCED A CONCEPT WHICH HE WAS TO REPEAT ON  
SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION. HE NOTED  
THAT AAP HAD BEEN BASED UPON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH FIVE  
SEPARATE PARTIES (THE GENEVA PARTICIPANTS). THE UK HAD NEVER  
ACCEPTED THE PF'S POSTION THAT THE SALISBURY GROUP SHOULD BE  
DEALT WITH AS ONE ELEMENT. HOWEVER, IF IN SALISBURY IT BECOMES  
APPARENT THAT THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DEMANDS TO BE DEALT WITH AS  
AN ENTITY, THE UK WILL HAVE TO LOOK AT THE WHOLE NEGOTIATING  
SITUATION AGAIN ON THE BASIS OF DEALING WITH TWO PARTIES  
RATHER THAN FIVE. THIS WOULD AFFECT QUESTIONS RELATING TO  
BALANCE OF POWER ON THE GC.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----042423 161608Z /41

O 161325Z APR 78 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PRETORIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE  
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EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

10. DURING CONVERSATION THAT ENSURED, NKOMO WITH SOME URGING FROM MUGABE CHANGED HIS PHRASEOLOGY FROM "DOMINANCE" TO "PREDOMINANCE AND THEN TO "A SIMPLE MAJORITY" TO DESCRIBE PF'S REPRESENTATION ON THE GC. AMBASSADOR YOUNG NOTED THAT PF'S PROPOSALS HAD COMPLETELY CHANGED SITUATION. WE HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO SALISBURY IN TOTAL AGREEMENT ON THE AAP WITH PF. WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN POSITION TO SELL AGREEMENT TO OTHER PARTIES. HOWEVER, NOW WE HAVE TO GO AS A MEDIATOR. NKOMO AND MUGABE SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT POSITION. YOUNG NOTED THAT THEIR POSITION WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT THAT RIGHT NOW WE CAN'T DELIVER SMITH. HE ASSERTED THAT PF "HAD CHANGED THE BALL GAME TODAY." THE PEOPLE IN SALISBURY WOULD HAVE TO FEEL THEY HAD BEEN DEFEATED BEFORE THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PF PLAN. "IF THEY WOULD AGREE ON THE TERMS YOU HAVE OFFERED, CONFIDENTIAL

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WE WOULD BE THRILLED," STTED YOUNG, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT LIKELY.

11. OWEN'S POSITION IN DISCUSSION OF PF'S PROPOSALS FOR GC

WAS THAT IT WAS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF WHAT WAS PROPOSED IN THE WHITE PAPER OR DISCUSSED IN MALTA. REPEATING THE LINE HE ESTABLISHED APRIL 14 ON PF PROPOSALS, OWEN NOTED THAT HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT THE PF'S POSITION WAS NECESSARILY WRONG. HE DID NOT REJECT IT--"IT MAY BE THE WAY THINGS ARE MOVING"--HOWEVER IT COULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION UNDER THE AAP. AN EXECUTIVE GC IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AAP. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD THE PF POSITION, IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR A NEUTRAL TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY. HE NOTED THAT, IF IN FACT IT TURNS OUT THAT THE SALISBURY PARTICIPANTS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE ONE GROUP, IT MAY PROVE TO BE A DIFFERENT STORY. OWEN REPEATED THAT WE MIGHT BE AT THE POINT OF CHANGING FROM NEGOTIATIONS AMONG FIVE PARTIES TO ONE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES. HE STRESSED THIS MAY HAVE MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THE TYPE OF GOVERNING COUNCIL WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS WHICH THE PF IS DEMANDING WILL NECESSARILY REQUIRE NEGOTIATION AMONG THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE THE REPRESENTATIONAL BALANCE.

12. POLICE: AS AGREED BEFORE THE MEETING, THE UK-US SIDE PRESENTED ITS POSITION ON THE POLICE QUESTION. OWEN REVIEWED THE EVOLUTION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN THINKING NOTING THAT INITIALLY NATIONALISTS HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF COUNTER-COUP FROM SMITH'S ARMY AND THAT IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN AGREED THAT THOSE FORCES SHOULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND A NEW ARMY BE CREATED BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. HOWEVER AS PART OF THAT UNDERSTANDING THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD BE ABLE TO USE THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER DURING THE POTENTIALLY DIFFICULT DAYS OF THE TRANSITION. HE SAID THAT LORD CARVER'S INSISTENCE  
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IN SALISBURY THAT A NEW COMMISSIONER OF POLICE WOULD HAVE TO BE APPOINTED WAS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT MOST INCENSES THE RHODESIAN FRONT. HE NOTED THAT IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED PF ANXIETIES ABOUT POLICE, WE HAD PUT FORWARD AT MALTA SUGGESTIONS FOR A UN POLICE PRESENCE. OWEN NOTED THAT THE PF HAD ESSENTIALLY MAINTAINED THE SAME POSITION AT MALTA AS IT DOES IN DAR ON THE POLICE. THE STRENGTH OF PF FEELINGS HAD OBVIOUSLY INTENSIFIED, HOWEVER. HE NOTED THAT PF'S POSITION ON POLICE CONSTITUTES A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE AAP WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT IF ONE OF THE PARTIES HAS A PREDOMINANT POSITION IN THE POLICE AS WELL AS IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, WORLD OPINION COULD NOT BE SATISFIED OF THE FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS.

13. NKOMO RESPONDED TO THE SECRETARY THAT IT WAS VERY SAD THAT THE UK/US WERE BEING SO INTRANSIGENT. LENGTHY AND SOMETIMES HEATED CONVERSATION ENSUED IN WHICH NKOMO AND MUGABE ARGUED THAT THE CURRENT POLICE FORCE IS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE FORCE FLIGHTING THE PF--POLICE FUNCTIONS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE COMBINED

OPERATIONS COMMAND. THEREFORE, THE SAME TYPE OF APPROACH ADOPTED  
IN RELATION TO THE RHODESIAN ARMY WAS CALLED FOR. THE PF IS

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----042447 161639Z /50

O 161325Z APR 78 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PRETORIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
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EXDIS

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PREPARED TO INTEGRATE ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT POLICE  
FORCE INTO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT POLICE. NKOMO MADE THE POINT  
THAT THE UN POLICE FORCE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBSERVE THE  
FAIRNESS OF THE INTEGRATION. NKOMO AND MUGABE PRESSED HARD FOR  
OWEN AND VANCE TO AGREE TO ACCEPT THE PF POSITION, AT LEAST  
AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON. THE  
SECRETARIES REFUSED TO DO SO. OWEN SAID THAT WE MUST STICK  
TO THE AAP ON THIS ISSUE AND COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A  
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT WHILE PF'S POSITION  
ON POLICE COULD NOT BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN AAP, IT IS THE SORT  
OF THING THAT THE PF WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH THE OTHER  
PARTIES. AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND SECRETARY VANCE SUPPORTED OWEN'S  
POSITION. YOUNG RESTATED THAT MAINTENANCE OF THE POLICE AS  
THE BASIC INSTRUMENT OF LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION  
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WAS "A TRADE OFF" FOR BASING THE NEW ARMY ON THE LIBERATION FORCE. PF REJECTED THIS STRONGLY.

14. IN RESPONSE TO NKOMO'S REQUEST,CARVER, WITH HIS CUSTOMARY PRECISION, WENT OVER HIS PROPOSALS FOR THE ZNA. HE EXPLAINED HOW STARTING WITH APPROXIMATELY 80,000 ARMED MEN, DIVIDED MORE OR LESS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PF AND THE RHODESIAN REGIME, A NEW ARMY WOULD BE CREATED. ZNA WOULD BE COMPOSED OF 10,000 REGULAR TROOPS, 4,000 RESERVE ELEMENTS AND AN UNARMED ZIMBABWE NATIONAL GUARD OF ABOUT 10,000 SPREAD AROUND THE COUNTRY IN COMPANY UNITS. DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD ALL ARMED FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW ARMY. PURELY WHITE UNITS WOULD BE ABOLISHED, UNCLUDING THE TERRITORIALS. IN THE ZNA THE BALANCE BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK WOULD APPROXIMATE THAT OF THE POPULATION. HE STATED THAT THE ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE RDF WOULD BE THE CURRENT THREE BATTALIONS OF THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLES WHICH WOULD BE MERGED WITH "FOUR OF FIVE INFANTRY BATTALIONS FROM YOUR FORCE." SUPPORT ELEMENTS WOULD BE DRAWN FROM BOTH AND WITH EXCEPTION OF TRANSPORT PLANES, THE AIR FORCE WOULD BE GROUNDED.

15. NKOMO ASKED WHETHER THE FORCES WOULD BE MERGED BEFORE OR AFTER TRANSITION DAY. CARVER RESPONDED THAT HTIS WOULD HAPPEN AFTER TRANSITION DAY AS THE TRANSITION ITSELF COULD ONLY COME ABOUT WHEN AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE ZNA. CARVER ASKED WHETHER THE PF ACCEPTED THAT ON TRANSITION DAY PF COMMANDERS WOULD COME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN ORDER TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CARRY OUT AGREEMENTS ON THE CEASEFIRE AND ZNA. MUGABE RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS ALL ISSUES ARE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE OF TRANSITION.  
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16. OWEN NOTED THAT MANY OF THE DEFENSE AND POLICE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PF COULD BE DISCUSSED IN DIRECT TALKS. WHEN QUESTIONED, HE DEFINED DIRECT TALKS AS AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING WITH THE UK AND US PRESENT. SECREATARY VANCE NOTED THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO GET AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING SOMETIME IN MAY. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION EXPRESSED OVER DATES WITH BOTH VANCE AND NKOMO INDICATING THAT THE OTHER HAD NOTED THAT APRIL 25 WAS IMPOSSIBLE. FINALLY, SECRETARY VANCE STATED THAT WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING FOR APRIL 25TH, BUT IF THAT PROVED IMPOSSIBLE, WE WOULD TRY FOR MAY. AMBASSADOR YOUNG NOTED THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE SALISBURY PEOPLE WOULD WANT TO

MEET NOW. NKOMO WARNED THAT HE DID NOT WANT A REPEAT OF WHAT HAPPENED WHEN CARVER WAS UNABLE TO SET UP A MEETING IN MALTA WITH SMITH LAST NOVEMBER AND THE PF SAT WAITING FOR MONTHS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. MUGABE SAID THAT PF IS VERY INTERESTED IN UK-US REACTIONS TO PF PROPOSALS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE RELATING TO THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCE. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE ON THE UN FORCE BUT THAT LANGUAGE MUST BE CLARIFIED.

17. NKOMO ASKED THAT AN AGREED PRESS LINE BE DEVELOPED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESS BE TOLD THAT A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED EXCEPT IN AREAS WHERE THE US AND UK WOULD CONSULT FURTHER ON THE PF'S PROPOSALS. OWEN RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY IN THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER FURTHER CERTAIN OF THE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE AAP. SECRETARY VANCE SUGGESTED THAT THE PRINCIPALS MEET AGAIN AFTER DINNER AT THE STATE HOUSE TO WORK OUT AN AGREED PRESS LINE, NOTING AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. VANCE

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SECTO, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 apr 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978SECTO04074  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780163-0869  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** SECRETARY PRETORIA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
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**Line Count:** 512  
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**Office:** ACTION SS  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 10  
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**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2953441  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** RHODESIA: ANGLO-AMERICAN/PF MEETING AFTERNOON APRIL 15 SUMMARY: THIRD MEETING OF FULL DELEGATION BEGAN LATE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 15TH AFTER DAY OF NEG OTIATIONS AMONGST PR  
**TAGS:** PDEV, RH, UK, US, PATRIOTIC FRONT  
**To:** STATE USUN NEW YORK  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/e90828ad-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014